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Abstract
The literature on economic determinants of democratization has identified most im-
portantly the positive effect of economic development and negative effect of income
inequality. We confirm these results using more recent data and dynamic panel models.
In this regard, the 2018 World Inequality Report has noted that inequality is highest in
the Middle East, where it has stayed stable at that high level for the past several decades.
Keywords: Inequality, Income Distribution, Democracy
JEL code: P16, O10
1. Introduction
Although the literature on democracy deficit in the Middle East, for example, Elbadawi
and Makdisi (2010), has touched on the problem of inequality, the effect of inequal-
ity on democracy has not been emphasized in this literature. In this regard, the 2018
World Inequality Report (available at https://wir2018.wid.world) has identified
the Middle East as the most unequal region in the world, with the top decile capturing
61% of national income. The report also noted that inequality in the region has persisted
at very high levels for the past several decades (pp. 5, 7, 131–7), declining somewhat
between 1990 and 2010, and then increasing thereafter. While much of the literature on
the Arab democracy deficit has focused on its economic consequences, including the effect
of democracy deficit on inequality – see, for example, Elbadawi and Makdisi (2010, p.
75), citing Rodrik (1999) – we highlight in this paper the role of income inequality as one
of the most important economic antecedents of democracy or lack thereof.
Our empirical study builds on another early literature, on economic determinants of
democracy, which has focused on two main causes, as summarized in Barro (1999). The
first cause, as theorized originally by Lipset (1959), is overall economic development,
which is measured typically by per capita income, levels and gender balance of primary
and higher education attainment, and the like. The second cause, highlighted in Muller
(1995), initially to explain some deviations from this previously hypothesized pattern
during the 1960s and 1970s, is the level of equality in income-distribution, especially as
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measured in Barro (1999) by the middle-income groups’ share of GDP. Finally, and con-
sistently with the findings of Bourguignon and Morrison (1990), Barro (1999) found that
high levels of natural resource endowment tend to impact democratization negatively,
which is another aspect of the “resource curse” that has long afflicted the Middle East.
According to the classical Kuznets (1955) hypothesis, inequality as a function of per
capita income may follow an inverted-U shaped curve. In earlier stages of economic
development, the hypothesis stipulates, inequality enhances long term economic growth
through the savings channel, because the rich have lower propensities to consume. How-
ever, Alesina and Perotti (1996) have highlighted the fact that high levels of inequality
can lead to political turmoil, which undermines long-term growth, even in developing
countries, through the investment channel. Research in the aftermath of the Arab Spring,
including a series of International Monetary Fund staff papers, c.f. Berg and Ostry
(2011) and Ostry et al. (2014), has found evidence for both channels of causation and
reverse-causation between economic growth and income inequality, which may also be
investigated at a variety of national and global scales, following Milanovic (2000).
The aim of this paper is to examine dynamically how the trend in income inequality
can explain the trend in democracy scores. Our motivation for pursuing this line of
inquiry is the democratization surge immediately following Arab uprisings, which was
followed by dramtic reversal. Although our sample covers the periods preceding and
following the 2011 uprisings, our focus is not on explaining the role of the middle class
or inequality in causing the uprisings, for example as in Diwan (2013). Rather, our aim is
to investigate (1) if the effect of income inequality on democracy, which was detected in
the earlier panel-data studies, has persisted, and (2) to use dynamic panel methods to
investigate the effects of trends in inequality on democratization or de-democratization.
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Figure 1: Middle Six Deciles’ Share in GDP Egypt)
To illustrate, we highlight the trends and relationships between Egyptian inequality
and democracy scores in this introductory section. The reversal in Egyptian income
inequality trends is exhibited in Figure 1, which shows the evolution of the six middle
Abdel-Latif and El-Gamal – Rising Inequality & De-Democratization — May, 2019 3
deciles’ shares in income from 1999 to 2015 (using income share data from wdi.world).
Those middle income shares (the sum of which was used in Barro (1999) to measure
middle class economic empowerment) rose significantly between 1999 and 2012, but
then had declined near their 2008 levels by 2015.
Figure 2 offers a comparison of the Egyptian and Turkish joint trends in inequality (mea-
sured by the sum of those six deciles’ shares in income) and democratization (measured
by V-Dem index of electoral democracy development). Although Turkey in general
exhibited higher democracy scores for the entire period, both countries have exhibited
a strong similarity in de-democratization during their episodes of increasing income
inequality, which started in Turkey in 2008 and in Egypt in 2012. This suggests the need
to extend Barro’s panel data estimation, c.f. Barro (1999, Table 3), of the effect of income
inequality on democracy, to allow for dynamic effects of increasing inequality.
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Figure 2: Trajectories for Inequality and Democracy Scores – Egypt & Turkey
The theoretical literature in political economy supports this dynamic view. Although
it may take many years for the economic empowerment of middle income groups to
result in greater democratization, short periods of rising income inequality can result
in sudden de-democratization, as argued in Tilly (2003). The political economy model
of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) suggests that demands by the general public may
force authoritarian regimes to choose between (i) offering superficial concessions, (ii)
increasing the scope and severity of their repression, or (iii) sharing some political and
economic power by allowing for greater degrees of democratization. As the economic
power of the middle class rises with declining inequality, they become less satisfied with
superficial concessions, and can punish the regime economically (e.g. strike) for choosing
increased repression, thus forcing a bargain on power sharing and democratization.
In Section 2, we describe the panel dataset that we compiled, and report estimates
of the relationships between income inequality and various measures of democracy
from a large panel of 134 countries over the period 1990–2017, using standard panel
fixed and random effects models. Our estimates in that section confirm with more
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extensive data the continued validity of the patterns established in Barro (1999). In
Section 3, we complement those earlier results with more dynamic panel data analysis
that incorporates lagged dependent and independent variables in a GMM framework.
We offer some concluding remarks in Section 4.
2. Panel Data Estimation of Income Inequality Effects on Democracy
We compiled an annual dataset for a large panel of 134 countries (listed in Table 5 in
the Appendix) during the period 1990–2017 to estimate the effects of each country’s
level of per capita Gross Domestic Product and income inequality (measured by the Gini
coefficient, and lagged in the dynamic specifications) on various democracy scores. The
first democracy score that we utilize is the popular “polity” index from the Marshall et al.
(2016) database. This score ranges from −10 to 10 (with higher values denoting more
democratic institutions). In addition, we utilize a number of detailed measures extracted
from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database in order to investigate different as-
pects of democratization (the dataset is available at https://www.v-dem.net/en/).
The main explanatory variables in our static and dynamic panel-data specifications are
the Gini coefficient and log of real per capita GDP. Data for these variables and other
controls were extracted from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
Although Barro (1999) had used both Gini coefficients and the middle three quintiles’
share of income in his analysis, we used only Gini coefficients in the results reported
here due to its wider availability, which enabled us to construct this large panel dataset.
Averages and standard deviations of the main variables used in the analysis, shown over
countries for every other year, are reported in Table 6.
Table 1 shows the estimation results of basic panel data models using fixed and random
effects. The results are consistent with those of Barro (1999): The level of democratization
(using all of our selected measures) increases in the level of economic development
(measured by log real per capita GDP) and decreases in the level of inequality (measured
by the country’s Gini coefficient). Moreover the coefficient for inequality is statistically
significant, and its magnitude does not vary significantly across the different V-Dem
component measures of democratization.
In Table 2, we report fixed effects and random effects estimates for the polity index only,
using additional control variables. We get similar results to Barro (1999) for the coeffi-
cients of the urbanization rate, which are positive and statistically significant, and the
share of fuel in merchandise exports, which are negative and statistically significant. We
also include the value added of the manufacturing and agriculture sectors as percentages
of GDP, finding that the former is positively correlated with polity scores, while the latter
is negatively correlated, and both effects are statistically significant.
Most importantly, the main results reported in Table 1 (and reproduced in Table 2,
columns 1 & 4) remain unchanged after we include these additional control variables.
The Hausman tests in Table 1 reject the random effects model in favor of the fixed effects
model for all democracy variables. Nonetheless, it is notable that the results in terms
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of sign, magnitude, and statistical significance are very similar for both methods. The
Hausman tests with additional controls in Table 2 still reject the random effects model in
favor of the fixed effects model for our most encompassing measure of democratization.
In the interest of space, we do not report the results of similar regressions for other
measures of democracy. The main result obtained in the earlier literature, that democracy
declines with inequality and increases with income per capita, continues to hold.
3. Dynamic Panel Estimation
Going beyond the standard panel model, we verify in Table 3 that the effect of inequal-
ity on democracy continues to be negative and statistically significant even when we
account carefully for dynamics. This table shows the results from Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) estimation of a dynamic panel data model with the five-year lag of
a country’s level of democratization as one of the explanatory variables, together with
lagged level of income inequality and contemporaneous log GDP per capita, using the
dynamic panel estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991). To deal with the potential bias and
inconsistency caused by lagged dependent variables and serially correlated residuals,
we used further lags of dependent and explanatory variables as instruments.
The resulting estimates show moderate persistence in all measures of the level of democ-
racy (with a coefficient of the 5-year lagged level of democracy greater than 0.1 and
very significant statistically for most measures), and the coefficients for log of real per
capita GDP and 5-year lagged Gini coefficients retain their expected signs and statistical
significance reported in Table 1. This shows that past levels of inequality have a strong
effect on current levels of democracy, as hypothesized in the introduction.
Next, we consider not only the level of past inequality, but also its trend. Table 4 adds
to our dynamic analysis a dummy variable for inequality having increased over the
past five years, and an interaction term for that dummy variable with the lagged level
of inequality. The results for most measures of democracy show that both the level of
past inequality and the direction of inequality matter, and the latter may be even more
important in terms of magnitude.
4. Concluding Remarks
Our results are consistent with modernization theories of democracy as described in
Inglehart and Welzel (2005). As we have witnessed in Turkey and Egypt, periods of eco-
nomic empowerment of the middle classes may drive societies to demand greater voice
in the governance of their countries, leading to temporary democratization. However,
for countries that have not established strong democratic institutions, it is very easy to
revert to de-democratization following episodes of growing income inequality.
We have used the Gini coefficient as our measure of inequality, as has been commonly
done in the literature. In this regard, it is well known that the Gini coefficient is most
appropriate for measuring changes in the middle range of the income distribution, which
is the primary measure of concern in Barro (1999) and this paper. However, the Gini
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Table 2: Fixed and Random Effects Models for polity, with Additional controls
Dep. Var. = polity
Fixed Effects Random Effects︷                                       ︸︸                                       ︷ ︷                                       ︸︸                                       ︷
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini Coeff. −0.062∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
log(GDP/Cap) 0.821∗∗∗ 0.053 0.168 0.871∗∗∗ 0.114 0.234∗∗
(0.087) (0.116) (0.126) (0.073) (0.102) (0.107)
Manuf/GDP 0.024∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Agric/GDP −0.036∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
UrbanPop/Pop 0.061∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Fuel/MerchExports −0.011∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant 2.167∗∗∗ 5.738∗∗∗ 4.988∗∗∗
(0.730) (0.888) (0.936)
Observations 3,669 3,557 3,446 3,669 3,557 3,446
R2 0.055 0.095 0.093 0.066 0.101 0.105
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.060 0.058 0.065 0.099 0.104
F Statistic 102.656∗∗∗ 71.614∗∗∗ 56.816∗∗∗ 258.178∗∗∗ 397.237∗∗∗ 404.935∗∗∗
Hausman FE vs. RE χ22 =19.73 χ
2
5 =38.02 χ
2
5 =59.24
p-value 5.2E-05 3.7E-07 6.4E-11
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coefficient is not the best measure if we were concerned about changes in the upper
tail of the distribution. A more complete analysis would consider the effects of extreme
inequality in the tails of income and wealth distributions, as considered in the recent
work of many authors who see the global decline of democracy as a consequence of
steadily rising extreme inequality, e.g. with special reference to Egypt and the Middle
East in Alvaredo and Piketty (2015) and Alvaredo et al. (2017).
A more complete dynamic analysis of the relationship between inequality and democracy
would integrate both directions of causation, from greater democracy to less inequality,
as investigated by Rodrik (1999), and from lower inequality to more democracy, as
investigated by Barro (1999), allowing for feedback effects. Ideally, such an analysis
would be coupled with more detailed forecasts of inequality trends for each country.
Unfortunately, the latter would require the study of country-level sectoral data that were
collected and reported using different methods. Although our analysis falls short of
providing the ideally complete dynamic picture of the relationship between inequality
and democracy, it has confirmed the importance of considering the direction of causation
from increasing inequality to de-democratization.
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Appendix
Table 5: List of Countries In Panel Data Analysis
Albania Algeria Angola Argentina
Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan
Bangladesh Belarus Belgium Benin
Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana
Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi
Cabo Verde Cameroon Canada Central African Republic
Chad Chile China Colombia
Comoros Congo, Dem. Rep. Costa Rica Cote d’Ivoire
Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark
Djibouti Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt, Arab Rep.
El Salvador Estonia Eswatini Ethiopia
Fiji Finland France Gabon
Gambia, Georgia Germany Ghana
Greece Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau
Honduras Hungary Iceland India
Indonesia Iran, Islamic Rep. Iraq Ireland
Israel Italy Jamaica Jordan
Kazakhstan Kenya Kyrgyz Republic Lao PDR
Latvia Lesotho Liberia Lithuania
Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives
Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mexico
Moldova Mongolia Montenegro Morocco
Mozambique Namibia Nepal Netherlands
Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway
Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay
Peru Philippines Poland Portugal
Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Senegal
Serbia Sierra Leone Slovak Republic Slovenia
Solomon Islands South Africa Spain Sri Lanka
Sweden Switzerland Tajikistan Tanzania
Thailand Timor-Leste Togo Tunisia
Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Kingdom
United States Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela, RB
Yemen, Rep. Zambia
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